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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
   
 
No. 11-1736 
   
 
JADWIGA WARWAS, 
                             Appellant 
 
v. 
 
CITY OF PLAINFIELD 
     
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D. C. No. 2-07-cv-04431) 
District Judge:  Honorable Jose L. Linares 
     
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
on April 27, 2012 
 
Before:  GREENAWAY, JR., ROTH and TASHIMA*, 
 
Circuit Judges 
(Opinion filed: July 25, 2012) 
   
 
O P I N I O N 
   
ROTH, Circuit Judge
Jadwiga Warwas brought this action, asserting (1) interference with her Family 
: 
and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA) rights and (2) retaliation against her for  
     
 
*Honorable A. Wallace Tashima, Senior United States Circuit Judge for the Ninth 
Circuit, sitting by designation. 
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asserting her First Amendment petition rights.  The District Court entered summary 
judgment in favor of the City of Plainfield, New Jersey, and Warwas appealed.  For the 
reasons expressed below, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.   
I.  
We write exclusively for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and 
legal history of this case.  Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our 
analysis.  
Background 
Warwas, a licensed medical doctor, commenced employment with Plainfield as a 
Health Officer in 2003.  Due to stress from several incidents unrelated to this litigation, 
Warwas developed peptic ulcers and clinical depression.  As a result, she could not work 
for several months and sought sick leave under the FMLA.  Plainfield requested that 
Warwas’s treating physician complete a medical provider certification form so it could 
determine her eligibility for FMLA leave.  Warwas’s physician complied and certified 
that Warwas “was restricted to home and could not work/attend school.” Plainfield 
granted the FMLA leave. 
Although Warwas was on FMLA leave and indicated that she had an acute serious 
health condition and was not able to work, she continued to work at home on a part-time 
job she had with the City of Paterson, New Jersey.1
                                                 
1 Warwas asserts that during her interview she informed Plainfield about the part-
time position as a Quality Assurance Coordinator. Plainfield denies knowledge of 
Warwas’s part-time employment. 
  When Plainfield discovered this, it 
sought to terminate Warwas’s employment with Plainfield, asserting that she had violated 
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its policy on outside employment.2  After a disciplinary hearing, the charges were 
sustained and Warwas’s employment was terminated on September 30, 2006.  Warwas 
appealed to the Merit System Board, which transferred the matter to the Office of 
Administrative Law.  An administrative law judge (ALJ) then determined that Warwas 
did not commit any misconduct because her part-time work “was not on City time nor in 
any way concealed” and that she “engaged in outside employment on her own unused 
sick or vacation time for which she was charged during her sick leave.”3
Upon Warwas’s return to work with Plainfield on April 7, 2008, she was informed 
that her office was unavailable and that she should return in two days.  The parties 
dispute whether Warwas ever returned to work.  On April 22, 2008, Plainfield informed 
Warwas that she was on unauthorized leave without pay and that further absences would 
result in her termination.  When she failed to report to work for the remainder of the 
 Although the 
Merit System Board adopted the ALJ’s factual findings, it nevertheless determined that 
Warwas’s utilization of paid sick time while she engaged in secondary employment was 
prohibited.  Accordingly, she was found guilty of conduct unbecoming an employee.  The 
Board, however, determined that termination was “too harsh a penalty;” therefore, it 
ordered Warwas’s immediate reinstatement and modified the punishment to a fine and an 
official written reprimand.  Neither party appealed the decision.      
                                                 
2  Plainfield’s Municipal Code prohibits employees from engaging in outside 
employment “without the prior and continued approval of the Department Director.” 
3  In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ found that Warwas disclosed her part-time 
position with Paterson and that no Plainfield official either objected to her continued 
employment or required her to abandon it as a condition of employment with the City. 
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week, Plainfield issued a preliminary notice of disciplinary action.  Warwas never 
requested a hearing, and, on May 19, 2008, Plainfield terminated her employment.  
Warwas brought this action.  After the close of discovery, Plainfield moved for 
summary judgment.  The District Court granted the motion and entered judgment against 
Warwas.  She appealed.  
II.  
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review of the District 
Court’s order granting summary judgment, and, in doing so, resolve all factual disputes 
and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.  
Callison v. City of Phila., 430 F.3d 117, 119 (3d Cir. 2005).  Summary judgment is 
appropriate when there “is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
Discussion 
A.  FMLA Interference Claim 
Warwas alleges that Plainfield interfered with her FMLA rights by terminating her 
employment while she was on leave.  The District Court did not reach the merits of this 
claim because it found that the doctrine of issue preclusion barred her from seeking relief 
under the FMLA.  The District Court held that the propriety of Warwas’s termination was 
already adjudicated by the Board, a quasi-judicial entity, and her interference claim 
merely sought to re-litigate the Board’s factual conclusion that she was guilty of conduct 
unbecoming an employee because she engaged in and received compensation for 
secondary employment while utilizing paid sick time.    
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Despite Warwas’s arguments that her FMLA claim is not precluded, we need not 
determine whether the District Court erred because, even assuming arguendo that she 
could proceed to the merits of her interference claim, summary judgment was 
nevertheless appropriate.  See Oss Nokalva, Inc. v. European Space Agency, 617 F.3d 
756, 761 (3d Cir. 2010)  (“It is an accepted tenet of appellate jurisdiction that we may 
affirm a judgment on any ground apparent from the record, even if the district court did 
not reach it.”) (internal quotations omitted) (citations omitted).  
The FMLA permits eligible employees to take up to “12 workweeks of leave 
during any 12-month period,” 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1), if a “serious health condition . . . 
makes the employee unable to perform the functions of the position of such employee,” 
id. at § 2612(a)(1)(D).  To prevent an employer’s interference with this leave, the FMLA 
grants employees a cause of action, an interference claim.  See id. at §§ 2615 & 2617.  To 
assert an interference claim, a plaintiff must prove that she was denied benefits that she 
was entitled to under the FMLA.  Callison, 430 F.3d at 119.  The FMLA, however, does 
not prohibit the termination of an employee who abuses her leave, id. at 121; Crouch v. 
Whirlpool Corp., 447 F.3d 984, 986 (7th Cir. 2006), nor does it shield an employee from 
dismissal merely because the alleged misconduct occurred while on leave.  Callison, 430 
F.3d at 121.  Consequently, an employer may defeat an FMLA claim if the discharge was 
based upon the employer’s honest belief that the plaintiff either misused or failed to use 
her medical leave for the intended purpose.  Crouch, 447 F.3d at 986. 
The record clearly indicates that Plainfield terminated Warwas for reasons entirely 
unrelated to the exercise of her rights under the FMLA.  It is also beyond dispute that 
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Plainfield believed Warwas failed to use FMLA leave for the intended purpose when, 
despite her assertion and a doctor’s note that a serious medical condition prevented her 
from working, she worked for Paterson while on sick leave.  See Crouch, 447 F.3d at 
986.  Warwas is not entitled to a greater degree of protection for violating Plainfield’s 
Municipal Code merely because she was on FMLA leave when caught and terminated.  
Consequently, Warwas was terminated not for her use of FMLA leave, but rather for the 
perceived misuse of the leave and for her failure to return to work.  See Sarnowski v. Air 
Brooke Limousine, Inc., 510 F.3d 398, 403 (3d Cir. 2007).  We, therefore, conclude that 
summary judgment was appropriate on this claim.4
B.  First Amendment Retaliation Claim  
 
 Warwas asserts that her appeal to the Board for reinstatement of employment was 
protected by the First Amendment’s Petition Clause and that Plainfield’s May 2008 
termination of her employment for failing to report to work constituted retaliation for 
petitioning the Board.  To establish a First Amendment retaliation claim, based upon the 
Petition Clause, a plaintiff must prove (1) that the First Amendment protected the activity 
in question, (2) that a government agent responded with a retaliatory action, and (3) that 
the protected activity was a substantial factor in the retaliation.  Brightwell v. Lehman, 
637 F.3d 187, 194 (3d Cir. 2011).  In circumstances where the plaintiff is a government 
employee, the First Amendment only protects against retaliatory actions if the protected 
                                                 
4  Warwas also contends that Plainfield failed to advise her of its policy regarding 
outside employment during FMLA leave and, in doing so, interfered with her FMLA 
rights.  We find this argument without merit. 
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activity involved a matter of public concern.  Borough of Duryea, Pa. v. Guarnieri, __ 
U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2500 (2011).   
Here, Warwas sought review of disciplinary findings, which included whether 
termination was an appropriate penalty for her alleged misconduct.  Thus, her action 
concerned a private personnel grievance, not a matter of public concern. Id. at 2501.  
Because Warwas did not address matters of public concern, she was not protected by the 
First Amendment.  See Gorum v. Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179, 187 (3d Cir. 2009).  Thus, we 
will affirm the District Court’s entry of summary judgment on this claim.5
III.  
       
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
Conclusion 
                                                 
5  Warwas also asserts that the District Court erred because it improperly applied 
the summary judgment standard by resolving disputed issues of material fact in favor of 
Plainfield.  We find this argument without merit.  
